James D. Sidaway
As critical political geographers have shown, it is important to move
beyond the acceptance of geopolitics as a reality of world politics and to
examine critically the ways in which geopolitical terms are defined and the
significant social meanings they hold. (Marston and Rouhani 2001, 101–02)
…
the historically distinct conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine have in
recent years come to be more and more connected. Militants in each, secular
nationalist (Saddam) as well as Islamist (Osama bin Laden), portray the cause of
resistance to the West and its regional allies in the Muslim world as one. They
also, most importantly, see an opportunity in connecting these crises to
mobilize support in pursuit of their major goal, retaining, or taking control of
their countries. Two or three decades ago the connections were much weaker, even
between Palestine and the Gulf. Now these two epicentres are tied, with
extension to Bosnia in the north-west and Afghanistan and Kashmir to the east
and south. This is the new, rhetorical and militarized political geography of
the new greater West Asian crisis. (Halliday 2002, 40)
Flanking
this space of “new greater Western Asian crisis” are American weapons and
troops. This is all the more evident if we take account of the two key American
alliances, the long-standing accord with Saudi Arabia, and the even deeper
alliance with Israel (and if we therefore consider the role of U.S. made
weaponry in Israeli and Saudi hands). On one significant level, therefore, now
is a time of the assertion of American geopolitical hegemony in the region. Of
course, as readers of The
Arab World Geographer will know, the United States has long played a key
role in most of Arabia and the Gulf, as well as much of the wider Middle East,
the Indian Ocean, and parts of the Balkans. But in 2002 and 2003 this has been
dramatically extended into Central Asia and to Iraq. The wider consequences of
this are—and will likely remain for some time—unclear, although there must
be little doubt that they will be deep and enduring. In this commentary I want
to consider briefly an aspect of the media coverage of the recent phase of
conflict in Iraq, especially the role of Arab television channels, of which by
far the most prominent is the Qatar-based aljazeera.
This may appear as a relatively trivial concern, and to those who have suffered
injury or lost friends, loved ones, or livelihoods in the recent fighting and in
its chaotic aftermath, it certainly is. However, I will argue that the enhanced
visibility of aljazeera
is symptomatic of a wider possibility.
One
thing that was evident in Western television coverage of the first Gulf War
(that of 1990–1991) is that the agenda for live television coverage then was
set by CNN. Other American networks subsequently imitated its style of live
feeds. CNN’s role in the early 1990s lead to extensive debates about
geopolitical representation, of which Baudrillard’s (1991) arguments about
televisual war are probably the best known.1 During the conflict that followed
the 2003 American and British invasion of Iraq, CNN was still evident, along
with competitors of broadly
the same format, such as BBC World and the more tabloid-like and right-wing
Fox news (owned by Robert Murdoch’s multinational news corporation). The
scandalous jingoism of most of the American networks can only be fully
appreciated when the psycho-political shock of 11 September is taken into
account. Yet during the latest war in Iraq all these networks (and many other
broadcasters) frequently resorted to feeds from aljazeera
and other Arab sources. Certainly, these images were variously edited, censored,
overwritten, and re-narrated by the Western networks (especially Fox, which
seeks to twist everything into a manifestation either of “American
patriotism” or its “terrorist enemies”). Later, aljazeera
would be condemned by ministers in the British and American governments. More
significantly, the Web sites of aljazeera
and its correspondents were targeted (hacked and attacked). And their ability to
reach a wider audience was very often compromised, both through such editing and
by direct state regulation, in some places extending to outright banning. Yet
despite all this, the overall media coverage of the Gulf War of 2003 had
something of a different (and perhaps unexpected) feel, precisely by virtue of
the role of the alternative sources, such as those aljazeera
feeds (however compromised, fragmentary, and limited the experience of these may
have often been).
This difference is a symptom of a wider possibility; as images from
elsewhere become either directly available or creep into the very
English-language Western media that, otherwise, might appear to be
sympathetic to or directly in the service of that would-be drive for American
hegemony. Such “decentring,” however modest, offers some subversive possibility.
In the midst of the relative absence of directly critical and dissident voices
in much of the mainstream media, this possibility is to be seized and
supplemented. Moreover, in this context, geographers have an opportunity, a
vocation, and a responsibility to offer our students (and whatever wider
audiences we reach) alternative interpretive frameworks for critical
understanding. How, for example, does the present conflict rest on earlier
imperial strategies and the impact of the Cold War in the Mashreq?
The historical, cultural, and political geography of British, French, and
American imperialism, Zionism, and Arab nationalism thereby become live issues.
How does the conflict relate, too, to the economic geography of the key
commodity of oil? The latter question also raises many wider ecological and
socio-economic matters and enables links to the global and regional geographies
of “development,” finance, and production.
In
other words, there is now scope for some select “lessons in geography.”
Where effective, these will sharpen critical
visions of and foreground alternatives to the “new rhetorical and militarized
political geography of the new greater West Asian crisis” (Halliday 2002, 40)—and
all that accompanies it.
1
For some critical engagements, see Merrin (1994), Ó Tuathail (1993), and
Sidaway (1998). Let me also take the opportunity to recommend the excellent,
UK-based Arab
Media Watch (www.arabmediawatch.com) as a useful font of critical sources.
Baudrillard, J. 1991. La
Guerre du Golfe n’a pas eu lieu. Paris: Galilée.
Halliday, F. 2002. Two hours that
shook the world—September 11, 2001: Causes and consequences. London: Saqi
Books.
Marston, S., and Rouhani, F. 2001. Teaching and learning the lesson of
complexity. The Arab World Geographer
4:100–02.
Merrin, W. 1994. Uncritical criticism? Norris, Baudrillard and the Gulf
War. Economy and Society 23:433–58.
Ó Tuathail, G. 1993. The effacement of place: U.S. foreign policy and
the spatiality of the Gulf Crisis. Antipode
25:4–31.
Sidaway, J. D. 1998. What is in a Gulf? From the “arc of crisis” to
the Gulf War. In Rethinking geopolitics,
ed. G. Ó Tuathail and S. Dalby, 224–39. London: Routledge.
(Submitted 20 April 2003)
© The Arab World Geographer
Editorial: Falah
Contributions: Dalby / Dijkink / Lustick / Hixson / Farhan / Shuraydi / Khashan / Reuber / Sidaway
Commentaries: Wesbter / Murphy / Agnew