Commentary I: Comments on War in Iraq Essays
Gerald
Webster
Department of Geography, The University of
Alabama, 202 Farrah Hall, Box 870322, Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35487-0322
U.S.A.
I
would like to thank Professor Falah and The Arab World Geographer for
inviting me to comment on these nine essays. They provide an array of
interesting and thought-provoking perspectives on
the on-going conflict in Iraq. The authors represent a valuable cross-section of
backgrounds, perspectives, and disciplines. A full commentary would greatly
exceed my space allocation, so I will first focus on a few notable points in
each of the essays, concluding with some brief thoughts of my own.
Approximately
half of the essays note the power and influence of language and the media in the
conflict. Lustick, for example, points out that the U.S. uses labels like
“liberation,” “administration,” and “nation-building,” while many
Arabs see “conquest,” “occupation,” and “exploitation.”
He suggests that such “semantic skirmishes” are among the first
volleys of a “long discursive war” over how the current intervention will be
used to define future relationships between the U.S. and the U.K., on the one
hand, and the Muslim world, on the other. Lustick argues that the views of many
in the Muslim world “match Osama Bin Laden’s preferred narrative—war
against the infidel invaders, revolution against existing Muslim regimes, and
the development of weapons of mass destruction for use against the Christians
and Jews occupying Muslim lands.” His points are clearly of great
importance—the actions of the U.S. and the U.K. may well have confirmed the
veracity of Bin Laden’s charges in the minds of many Muslims. If
Anglo-American forces are not to be viewed as the “new Mongols,” their
rebuilding effort must be masterful and they must depart Iraq in months and not
years.
Reuber’s
essay also focusses upon the power and use of language in preparing nations for
war, in this case in the development of a “good reason” for “just war.”
He argues that “geopolitics is a war of discourse on space, power, and
politics” that is used not only to define “Good and Evil, but also to locate
and confine such stereotypes in space, creating different territories separating
“us” from “them.” To counteract these efforts, Reuber suggests that
political geographers adopt a critical geopolitics that “aims at the
disclosure and the deconstruction of such geopolitical rhetorics and language
games.” Clearly, this is an important and invaluable task, and the conflict
over Iraq has produced a quantity of rhetoric that will take time to review and
analyze fully. In this project attention should also be paid to how such
geopolitical divisions are redressed after the end of large-scale hostilities.
In short, at the end of the war what efforts will be necessary to undo the
Othering effected to justify the war at its initiation? I fear that the
counterproductive, if not patently false stereotypes, emanating from this war
will remain embedded in national world views for generations to come.
Hixson’s
essay also includes significant focus upon the use of imagery in the pursuit of
“Iraqi freedom,” though in the broader context of the U.S.’s selective use
of “Manifest Destiny.” Hixson’s thesis is that American actions
demonstrate “a remarkable degree of continuity in foreign policy throughout
U.S. history, rooted in perceptions of national identity, with ‘America’ as
the standard bearer of freedom worldwide.” From this perspective, just as
Manifest Destiny sanctioned 19th century conflicts so the U.S. could
“civilize” others, “Operation Iraqi Freedom” is justified by the
U.S.’s perceived obligation to democratize the world. Hixson views the
justification for this “identity-based foreign policy” as being “rife”
with an “array of double standards and contradictions.” He does not believe
that the American people comprehend these contradictions sufficiently to “rein
in the nation’s runaway militarism.” But a possibly more important question
is Why? The American public did accept that Iraq was a threat to the United
States and embraced the invasion with substantial support. Dissident voices were
quickly vilified with slogans of “love it or leave it,” characteristic of
the Vietnam era. I suspect this patriotic or nationalistic fervour has more to
do with the galvanizing events of September 11th than with Saddam Hussein.
Sidaway’s
essay also concentrates on communications, in this case, the contrasts between
the presentation of the war by the media in the U.S. and U.K. and that in Aljazeera
and other Arab world outlets. While accusing the American networks of
“scandalous jingoism,” Sidaway argues that Fox was among the worst, due to
its twisting of “everything into a manifestation of either ‘American
patriotism’ or its ‘terrorist enemies’.”
Despite these concerns, Sidaway notes that “the overall media coverage
of the Gulf War of 2003 had something of a different (and perhaps unexpected)
feel; precisely by virtue of the role of the alternative sources such as those Aljazeera
feeds.” Although my access to such alternative sources was largely limited to
the Internet, it was clear that Aljazeera had an effect on worldwide
coverage (e.g., Jayasekera 2003). Most notably, the media, including these
alternative sources, became part of the story, as complaints about coverage and
bias were included in both the television and print media. Sidaway suggests that
these “images from elsewhere” decentred the English-language Western
media, providing for “alternative interpretative frameworks for critical
understanding.” CNN and other U.S. media clearly provided a more
“sanitized” version of the war, with far fewer images of dead bodies and
destroyed buildings than were shown on Arab outlets, including Aljazeera (Zwirko
2003). Some in the U.S. were clearly hostile to Aljazeera’s
coverage as being biased in the same manner those in the Arab world were
critical of Fox and CNN (Qusti 2003). A fuller examination of these differences
may well shed substantial light on media independence, bias, and influence over
the development of national, if not nationalistic, world views.
Dijkink’s
essay includes a number of thoughtful points, including the use of geographical
dichotomies (e.g., Old vs. New Europe), and the psychological war that the West
has seemingly lost, due to the invasion’s confirming Arab suspicions about the
West’s intentions. He also discusses the role of the state in international
law, the role of the “strongest state” in the international system, and the
difficulties faced by those overseeing the reconstitution of the Iraqi state.
Given that the process of “rebuilding” Iraq is underway, I found this
discussion of substantial interest. Dijkink argues that in the absence of Saddam
Hussein and the Baath regime, there are “no real binding factors among the
three cultural groups in Iraqi society.” Thus how will Shiite Arabs, Sunni
Arabs, and Sunni Kurds be peacefully drawn into a stable liberal democracy,
particularly if the structure is implemented by “external actors”? Given the
distrust, if not animosity, among these groups, as well as their nationalist
sentiments, the task, whether undertaken by Iraqis or overseen by Americans,
will surely face monumental obstacles (Akbar Dareini 2003). If, for example, a
confederation is created, its constituent first-order civil divisions will be
dominated, in different parts of the country, by Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis,
respectively. These divisions may well be viewed as the incubators of separation
among a Kurdish north, a Sunni centre, and a Shiite south. While the long-term
roles of Kurds in Turkey or Shiites in Iran are unknown, the potential for
devolution, if not balkanization, clearly exists. In short, was Saddam to Iraq
what Tito was to Yugoslavia? If so, winning the peace will be far more difficult
than winning the war.
Khashan’s
essay characterizes the Anglo-American forces as the “new Mongols,” alluding
to the sacking and burning of Baghdad in the mid-13th century by Hulagu’s
Mongol armies. The use of this parallel is important because it illustrates
contrasts in the cultural senses of time and history between the United States
and the Arab world. In the Arab world the Mongols and the Crusaders are not
ancient history but, in part, define the region’s current world view and
understanding of its all too common past negative experiences with external
forces (e.g., Kandell 2003). I do not believe that many in the West adequately
appreciate this cultural difference, a fact made clear in President Bush’s use
of the word “crusade” in reference to U.S. efforts in the region some months
ago. Khashan’s comments also demonstrate a sense of outrage over the invasion
and the general American “obsession with violent solutions.” He also clearly
believes that the British and the Americans used Iraq’s alleged weapons of
mass destruction as a pretext for the invasion, whereas “predatory capitalism,
Protestant fundamentalism, and Washington’s powerful Zionist lobby” were the
true motivating factors. Such claims underscore the problems the Bush
administration and the United States will face if no weapons of mass destruction
are found in Iraq.
Farhan’s
selection echoes the heartfelt indignation over the Anglo-American invasion of
Iraq found in Khashan’s essay. Noting Baghdad’s central role in the history
of civilization and culture, he states that “it is a strange geopolitical
emblem for our time: the world’s technological most ‘advanced’ power
attacking a nation sited at the very beginnings of West Asian and Western
civilization.” He too doubts the veracity of claims that the invasion was
undertaken to “liberate” the Iraqi people for the installation of
“democracy.” Calling such motivations a “sham,” Farhan holds that the
war is about oil and the subsequent “bonanza in the ‘reconstruction’ of
Iraq.” Buttressing his argument is the fact that American troops prevented
widespread destruction of Iraq’s oil fields, while not securing the Iraqi
National Museum, the latter arguably both a national and world treasure. Its
destruction bore an eerie similarity to the destruction of Kuwait’s National
Museum in 1990, and one must wonder why such priceless artefacts of world
cultural heritage were not secured as a first order of business. Farhan also
notes the apparent “double standard” utilized by the Americans and the
British as the foundation for the invasion, a standard that apparently does not
apply to other dictators and regimes in and out of the region. This theme
emerges in several of the essays and is clearly hard to easily refute.
Shuraydi’s
contribution also echoes many of the themes emerging in the other essays.
Holding that the attack on Iraq was illegal without a second UN resolution, he
argues that the purpose of United States’ decision to militarily “dismantle
Saddam Hussein’s regime” was to demonstrate the “new role of the U.S. as
the sole unchallenged global power.” Shuraydi claims that this “new
vision” can be traced to the 1997 “Project for New American Century.” He
argues that the Bush administration has been “hesitant and secretive to
publicly provide the true motive for the war” and that there is a “hidden
agenda” for the U.S.’ “war on Iraq.”
The Bush administration’s enunciation of the motives for war in Iraq
are viewed as suspect in many of these essays. Clearly administration
spokespeople did not stay “on message” in their explanations, which
variously emphasized weapons of mass destruction, terrorist ties, regime change,
and liberating the Iraqi people. While many Americans have now concluded that
the purpose of the war was “all of the above,” these variable emphases have
been interpreted as “mission creep” or duplicity in other parts of the world
and are damaging U.S. credibility (e.g., Hakki 2003). Shuraydi also notes the
difficulty the Bush administration faces as it seeks support for its “Road Map
for Peace.” While I am encouraged by the initiation of any new discussion
between the Palestinians and Israelis, I must agree with him that it is an
“almost impossible task” given the current political climate.
Dalby’s
contribution reiterates several themes already noted in the other essays,
including the double standard’s providing the foundation for the
Anglo-American invasion of Iraq. In multiple places he notes that the Bush
administration has “relied on a strange assumption that the Iraqi people
understood the world in a similar manner to American political leaders” and
that American exceptionalism is too easily “invoked to justify all sorts of
actions.” As he states, “the early stages of the war suggested that once
again assumptions of political rationality do not easily translate across
cultural and language barriers.” His point is well taken and this dilemma will
continue to bedevil American policy, until U.S. political leaders accept that
their world view is not uniformly embraced by all the nations of the world.
Dalby also comments on the work of Pentagon scholar Thomas Barnett and his 2003
article in Esquire magazine, which includes a map depicting the
geographical locations of threats to the world system. In Barnett’s vision,
there is a functioning, globalized “Core,” which is threatened by an
unconnected “Gap” of places not incorporated into the world system. The Gap
includes virtually all of Africa and Southwest Asia and is viewed as dangerous
because it is disconnected. As a result, it is “a strategic threat
environment,” requiring U.S. attention (Barnett 2003). Dalby comments that
this view “relies far too much on a simplistic division of the world into
geographical categories that suggest indigenous causes in the remote periphery
as the sources of all troubles, and simultaneously denies the importance of the
connections between the core and the periphery that are a source of at least
part of the contemporary violence.” His point is well taken and critical
comment on Barnett’s thesis is needed to prevent the U.S. from sliding back
into the simplistic geopolitical views of the past century.
Concluding
Comments
These
nine essays provide a wide-ranging and interesting analysis of the on-going
conflict in Iraq. Between them there are several near universal themes,
including the unclear motives for the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, the power
of rhetoric and “semantic skirmishes” in the conflict, and the adoption of a
double standard, used to target Saddam Hussein and not other dictators with
similar profiles. Less was included about the role of the UN or alternatives to
the present conflict. For example, what if a second resolution had been passed
in the UN? Would such a resolution have reduced or negated objections to the
invasion? In the absence of a second resolution sanctioning military action,
what options should have been selected? Should the UN inspectors have been given
as much time as needed to search for weapons of mass destruction, even if that
meant that sanctions remained in place for yet another decade? In spite of my
lack of support for the recent bloodshed, I also have substantial reservations
about the logic of the UN’s actions over the past decade with respect to Iraq.
If the UN was going to use sanctions, the body should have known that those most
hurt by their imposition were also those it wished to help. To sit and wait
indefinitely for a megalomaniac to comply with UN demands victimized the Iraqi
people and did little to create the circumstances for a peaceful resolution of
the conflict.
A
second issue pertains to the true motives for the invasion, a topic discussed in
most of the essays. The Bush administration claimed several motives for invading
Iraq, including the destruction of weapons of mass destruction, the eradication
of terrorist connections, the removal of a brutal and violent dictator, and the
liberation of the Iraqi people. The early emphasis was upon weapons of mass
destruction and the argument that such military action was defensive in a
post-September 11world. But nearly two months after the initiation of
hostilities, no substantial cache of such weapons has been found. Was there a
break down in U.S. intelligence, were the weapons destroyed as maintained by
Iraqi officials, or have Anglo-American forces simply been unlucky in the
search? I think the answer to this question is critical to many. While Americans
appear to have accepted alternative explanations for the use of the U.S.
military, other countries will certainly seize upon the lack of weapons of mass
destruction as evidence of ulterior motives. One motivating factor not
highlighted in these essays is presidential legacy. I believe the current
President Bush viewed his legacy and that of his father as being tied to Iraq
and Saddam Hussein. Thus Saddam Hussein’s removal was viewed as unfinished
business, a final chapter in the administration of the first President Bush and
a central element in the future legacy of the second President Bush.
A
final topic given variable emphasis in the nine essays pertains to the future of
Iraq, the “Middle East,” the UN, and the role of the United States in world
affairs. I agree with those who suggest that the reconstitution of Iraq with the
existing animosities among its three largest ethno-religious groups is
problematic, and I fear it may be impractical, if not impossible, given the
country’s experiences over the past century (Kandell 2003). Clearly, a
balkanized Iraq has implications for the region as a whole, in terms of
territorial divisions and destabilization. While I agree that the relevance of
the UN has been damaged, I do not believe it will become irrelevant. First, the
United States relies too heavily upon the body to be dismissive of it for too
long. Second, it is exactly times like these that can demonstrate the importance
of an international body such as the UN. The question is now whether the UN and
its member states are up to the task of reinforcing, if not redefining, the
body’s role in international affairs. The UN is far too critical to the
long-term success of any road map to peace for it to shrink from its role in the
wake of the current conflict.
Akbar
Dareini, Ali. 2003. Iraqi Shiite leader urges ‘modern Islamic regime.’ Birmingham
News 11 May: 3A.
Barnett,
Thomas P.M. 2003. The Pentagon’s new map: It explains why we’re going to
war, and why we’ll keep going to war. Esquire. Accessed 17 May 2003
from
on the World Wide Web.
Hakki,
Mohamed. 2003. The two Americas. Al-Ahram Weekly Online. 1–7 May.
Accessed 17 May 2003 from
on the World Wide Web.
Jayasekera,
Rohan. 2003. Iraq: Al-Jazeera and free expression: Shooting the messenger. 3
April. The Freedom of Information Center. Accessed 17 May 2003 from http://www.missouri.edu/~foiwww/jourwarcoverage/iraqaljazeera.html
on the World Wide Web.
Kandell,
Jonathan. 2003. Iraq’s unruly century. Smithsonian, 2 May (14):
44–53.
Qusti,
Raid. 2003. Study in contrast: CNN vs. Al-Jazeera. Arab News, 26 March.
The Freedom of Information Center. Accessed 17 May 2003 from http://www.missouri.edu/~foiwww/jourwarcoverage/studyincontrasts.html
on the World Wide Web.
Zwirko,
Walt. 2003. Embedded journalists’ reporting questioned. Dallas Morning News,
8 April. The Freedom of Information Center. Accessed 17 May 2003 from http://www.missouri.edu/~foiwww/jourwarcoverage/embeddedj.html
on the World Wide Web.
(Submitted
11 May 2003)
© The Arab World Geographer
Editorial: Falah
Contributions: Dalby / Dijkink / Lustick / Hixson / Farhan / Shuraydi / Khashan / Reuber / Sidaway
Commentaries: Wesbter / Murphy / Agnew